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1. Introduction
Merger and acquisition (M&A) activity has been increasing
in recent years in many industries including health services
(Japsen, 1996; The Economist, 1999). Mergers are expected
to bring efficiency gains in service or product delivery
systems. However, most of M&As seem to deliver disap-
pointing outcomes if they are to be evaluated on the basis of
efficiency or profitability as reported by Weil (2000).
Failures of mergers can be attributed to many reasons.
The lack of coordination and centralized control may be one
obstacle to fully benefit from mergers (Clement et al, 1997).
Although there can be managerial and cultural reasons to
this problem, in this paper we approach this issue from an
operational perspective. The question we are interested in is,
what is the potential benefit of full coordination and central-
ized control, and how should it be realized. We interpret
‘coordination’ as re-allocating resources and patients within
the network, and model this problem using an optimization
approach.
Our motivation comes from the health system transforma-
tion project in Turkey. One component of the project was
defined as ‘integration and harmonization of Ministry of
Health (MoH) and Social Security Institute (SSK) hospitals
towards greater autonomy’ (World Bank, 2004). When this
component was implemented in 2005, all the SSK hospitals
were acquired by the MoH, thus effectively merging the two
hospital networks. Before this merger, SSK and MoH hospi-
tals served separate populations. After the merger, members
of both populations have the right to get service from
any hospital within the merged network. This means that
previously unrelated hospitals are now linked, creating an
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opportunity to re-design the system. Moreover, the new
system introduces the referral of patients to hospitals by
family physicians. This makes it possible to impose an assign-
ment of patients to specific hospitals to optimize the system.
The existing health system faced many problems including
the ineffective geographical distribution of resources
(Morlock et al, 2004), and the under-utilization of hospitals
because of their small size and lack of resources in rural areas
(World Bank, 2003). There is also an ineffective allocation of
resources: A hospital may have a general surgeon but not an
anaesthesiologist, which makes it impossible to perform oper-
ations. On the other hand, after the merger there is a possi-
bility of unnecessary duplication of resources; this should be
avoided (Morlock et al, 2004). Existing doctors and hospital
beds can be re-allocated within the merged network to tackle
these problems. Since the doctors in these hospitals work for
the government, their posts can be changed if needed.
We present a hospital re-planning problem that could
be encountered in any country where hospital networks
are merged, and study efficiency gains obtained by M&As
in hospital networks. To this end, we provide an integer
programming model for the problem, and apply this model
using data from Turkish hospitals.
Our model takes into account several features related to
health systems: (1) enough demand is assigned to a hospital
service so that physicians can maintain service quality, (2)
availability of all resources required for a service is ensured
and (3) possibility to investigate whether to close hospitals is
provided. The aim of our model is to minimize the total system
cost, that is, the sum of the cost of changes in the hospital
network and the cost of access to service for the patients.
The model is also applicable to mergers of supply chain
systems. It may be used to re-allocate resources and assign
demand to facilities to minimize the total distribution cost of
the merged supply chain.
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The model focuses on cost minimization instead of benefit
maximization. One cost component is patients’ cost of access
to service. Minimizing this is equivalent to maximizing bene-
fits for patients since we assume that service quality is the
same at all hospitals.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2
reviews the literature. Section 3 introduces the model formula-
tion. In Section 4, we apply the model using hospital data from
a region of Turkey and show howmuch potential improvement
can be gained by consolidation of Turkish hospital networks.
We conclude in Section 5.
2. Literature review
There are two streams of research related to our problem.
One is concerned with performance effects of M&As and
mainly uses empirical methods; the other focuses on hospital
planning problems and uses facility location–allocation
models.
M&A activity has been analysed from various perspec-
tives in the general management literature. Some have studied
the benefits to shareholders from acquisitions, and found that
most of the gains accrue to the targets (Gupta and Gerchak,
2002). Connor et al (1997) analysedM&As in health networks
and showed that higher merger-related savings are accom-
plished by lower occupancy hospitals. The drivers of success
in hospital mergers are discussed by Weil (2000); utilization
patterns, financial ratios, corporate culture and contracts are
mentioned as important factors.
Harris et al (2000) investigated the gains in technical effi-
ciency after hospital mergers using longitudinal data envelop-
ment analysis (DEA). Sherman and Rupert (2005) used DEA
to analyse a 200-branch network formed after a merger of four
banks, and found opportunities to reduce operating costs after
the merger. Few papers have modelled mergers in an analyt-
ical framework, and they considered a production system as
opposed to a health system (Gupta and Gerchak, 2002; Iyer
and Jain, 2004).
Location–allocation models have been used quite exten-
sively for quantitative analysis in health services (Rahman
and Smith, 2000). A common objective is minimizing travel
cost (Rahman and Smith, 1999; Chu and Chu, 2000; Galvao
et al, 2002). A multi-objective heuristic approach for the
location–allocation decisions in a hospital network is intro-
duced by Stummer et al (2004). Dokmeci (1977) introduces
a quantitative model to decide facility location and capacities
in a hierarchical health care system.
Bretthauer and Cote (1998) provide an extensive review
of capacity management in health services. Few papers have
focused on the resource re-allocation in existing facilities.
Ruth (1981) models re-allocation of only beds using a mixed-
integer programming approach within an existing hospital
network. Geller and Yochmowitz (1975) looked at reduction
of maternity beds in a region and investigated bed closing
rules.
Verter and Lapierre (2002) model the problem of locating
preventive health care facilities with the objective of maxi-
mizing participation, with the requirement of assigning more
than a certain number of individuals to a facility because
of quality concerns. Harper et al (2005) model a stochastic
hospital planning problem with a discrete-event simulation
approach. Güneş and Yaman (2005) study a problem similar
to the one presented here, propose a model and present
preliminary results for the case where only beds can be
re-allocated.
Here, we give a model which considers the impacts of
closing hospitals, incorporates bounds on number of resources
that can be transferred, and proposes a more realistic view of
modelling capacities by considering different types of facil-
ities as space, number of rooms, etc. We present extensive
numerical results for the setting where two types of resources,
beds and specialist doctors can be re-allocated and show that
considerable amounts of improvement can be achieved by re-
allocation of specialist doctors. We also perform sensitivity
analysis to observe the quality/decentralization trade-off and
the effect of cost parameters on the level of improvements
achieved.
3. Problem definition and formulation
Our objective in this study is to find a better resource alloca-
tion after a merger of two networks and thus understand the
potential cost benefits of the merger. To this end, we model the
optimization of resource re-allocation in the merged hospital
network. The parameters of the problem are given in Table 1.
3.1. Assumptions on hospitals and resources
Let H denote the set of hospitals and P the set of popula-
tion centers. The hospitals offer a set of services, denoted
by S, and these services require a set of resources, denoted
by R. Each service s ∈ S requires a certain set of resources,
Rs ⊆ R, and these sets may not be mutually exclusive, that
is, some resources can be used for more than one service.
For a hospital network, the services are specialty services
like radiology, brain surgery. Examples of the resources are
specialist doctors, nurses, equipment and beds. For each
service, certain resources are required; for example, for
the mammogram service, a radiologist, a technician and a
mammography machine are needed. A hospital bed can be
used by any inpatient service, that is, a resource can be
required for more than one service.
Each resource has a certain capacity to serve patients for
a service; sr is the amount of resource r ∈ Rs required to
serve a patient in service s ∈ S. Each hospital has facilities
to hold different types of resources. We denote by C the set
of facility types (like space, number of rooms or offices, etc),
by Kic the capacity of facility type c ∈ C at hospital i ∈ H ,
by
∏
c ⊆ R the set of resources that use facility type c ∈ C
and by rc the amount of facility of type c ∈ C that a unit
resource r ∈ R uses.
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Table 1 Problem parameters
P the set of population centres
H the set of hospitals
R the set of resources
S the set of services
C the set of facilities used to accommodate resources in hospitals
Hi the set of hospitals to which resources can be transferred from hospital i ∈ H
Rs the set of resources that are required for service s ⊆ S
Cri the amount of resource r ∈ R available at hospital i ∈ H before the re-planning
sr the amount of resource r ∈ Rs required to serve a patient in service s ∈ S∏
c the set of resources that use facility type c ∈ C
rc the amount of facility type c ∈ C that a unit resource r ∈ R uses
Dks the number of patients in population centre k ∈ P who need service s ∈ S
Kic the capacity of facility type c ∈ C at hospital i ∈ H
tki the cost of travelling from population centre k ∈ P to hospital i ∈ H
ari j the cost of transferring a unit resource r ∈ R from hospital i ∈ H to hospital j ∈ Hi
pi the cost of closing hospital i ∈ H
m1s the minimum number of patients that should be served by service s ∈ S in any hospital
m2 the minimum number of services to be offered in an open hospital
si the maximum acceptable ratio of demand to capacity for service s ∈ S at hospital i ∈ H
ri the maximum fraction of resource r ∈ R that can be transferred from hospital i ∈ H
kri j the maximum amount of resource r ∈ R that can be transferred from hospital i ∈ H to hospital j ∈ Hi
Cri denotes the amount of resource r ∈ R available at
hospital i ∈ H before the re-planning. The resources at
hospital i ∈ H that can be transferred to a set of hospi-
tals are denoted by Hi ⊆ H . The cost of transferring a unit
resource r ∈ R from hospital i ∈ H to hospital j ∈ Hi is ari j .
The amount of resource r ∈ R transferred from a particular
hospital i ∈ H cannot exceed a certain fraction, ri of the
existing resource at hospital i if the hospital remains open.
This is a limitation that may be imposed to minimize detrac-
tion from resource transfers in the hospitals. There may also
be an upper bound on the amount of resource r transferred
from hospital i ∈ H to hospital j ∈ Hi , denoted by kri j . Such
a constraint may minimize the problem of resistance from
doctors who do not want to be transferred to certain rural
locations by not transferring too many doctors from the same
hospital.
3.2. Assumptions on assignment of patients to hospitals
Each population centre generates a certain demand for each
hospital service. We assume a utilization target is set in order
to cope with the variabilities in the system, that is, there is a
maximum acceptable ratio of demand to capacity for service
s ∈ S at hospital i ∈ H denoted by si . This is an approach
used by others (Stummer et al, 2004) to model similar prob-
lems in deterministic settings. The demand of population
centre k ∈ P for service s ∈ S is denoted by Dks and the
cost of transportation for a patient between population centre
k ∈ P and hospital i ∈ H is denoted by tki . This cost is typi-
cally a linear function of the distance or travel time. If cover
type constraints are imposed, then it is possible to change
this cost accordingly. For instance, if every patient should be
able to get service within M kilometers from his/her popula-
tion centre, then tki can be a linear function of distance for
distances less than or equal to M but it may be infinity for
larger distances. It is also possible to use more sophisticated
transportation cost functions, such as adding a fixed cost for
travelling in addition to a variable transportation cost which
may be a piecewise linear function of the distance. The trans-
portation costs between two population centres are considered
as parameters in our model, and the shape of the function
does not affect the model.
For hospital services, a minimum number of patients,
defined by a standard, should be served each year so that
a good quality of service can be maintained. Therefore, a
service can be offered at a hospital only if a minimum demand
is assigned to this hospital. This constraint can be tight
for some services, like screening mammogram, or surgery,
where physicians learn from practice. For other services like
emergency care, such a constraint may not be applicable
at all. This type of constraint was also used by Verter and
Lapierre (2002) in their model of location of mammogram
centres. Another reason to impose such a constraint can be
to justify the fixed costs of offering that service. We denote
this minimum value by m1s for service s ∈ S.
We assume that for a hospital to remain open after re-
planning, at least m2 services should be offered in this
hospital, otherwise the cost of closing the hospital i ∈ H
is pi . This constraint makes the model useful for general
hospitals, which should offer a variety of services. If such a
constraint does not apply, it can be relaxed by setting m2 =1.
3.3. Decision variables and the objective function
The decisions centre around the re-allocation of resources
to hospitals, the set of hospitals that remain open and their
service portfolios and the assignment of patients to hospitals
for different services. We use the following decision variables
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in our model. We define xri j as the amount of resource r ∈ R
transferred from hospital i ∈ H to hospital j ∈ Hi , zksi as the
demand from population centre k ∈ P assigned to hospital
i ∈ H for service s ∈ S, and Esi as the maximum number of
patients that can be treated at service s ∈ S at hospital i ∈ H
after the re-planning. The binary variable usi is 1 if service
s ∈ S is offered at hospital i ∈ H and 0 otherwise and yi is
1 if hospital i ∈ H remains open and 0 otherwise.
The objective is to minimize the total cost which is
composed of the cost of transferring resources, the cost of
closing hospitals and the cost of transportation of patients.
In fact, these costs are incurred by different parties. Typi-
cally, the system design costs (resource transfers and hospital
closures) are incurred by the decision maker (the state, or
the management of the health network), while the patient
transfer costs are incurred by the patients. Since our objective
is to optimize system-side performance, all cost components
are included in the objective function. As a policy maker, the
weight of patient transportation cost in decision making can
be changed giving different weights to the unit cost figures. If
the state has a budget for the project of re-designing the health
network, then the model can be modified easily to minimize
the patients travel costs subject to a budget constraint on the
design costs. Alternatively, if the decision maker is interested
in minimizing system design costs subject to cover type
constraints, this can be handled by assigning values to the
parameters tki ’s as explained in Subsection 3.2. The hospital
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zksi m1susi ∀s ∈ S, i ∈ H (7)
zksi Dksusi ∀k ∈ P, s ∈ S, i ∈ H (8)
∑
s∈S
usi m2yi ∀i ∈ H (9)
usi  yi ∀s ∈ S, i ∈ H (10)
xri j kri j ∀r ∈ R, i ∈ H, j ∈ Hi (11)
usi ∈ {0, 1} ∀s ∈ S, i ∈ H (12)
yi ∈ {0, 1} ∀i ∈ H (13)
xri j ∈ Z+ ∀r ∈ R, i ∈ H, j ∈ Hi (14)
zksi ∈ Z+ ∀k ∈ P, s ∈ S, i ∈ H (15)
Constraints (2) ensure that the amount of resources trans-
ferred from a hospital cannot exceed a fraction of the initial
amount of that resource at that hospital if the hospital remains
open. Constraints (3) imply that all demand is served. Owing
to constraints (4), the sum of the final capacities of services
using a resource cannot exceed the final amount of that
resource. The final amount of a resource is the previous
amount plus the net amount of transfers. Constraints (5) state
that the existing capacity multiplied with a maximum utiliza-
tion factor si for a service should be greater than or equal
to the demand assigned to that service. Constraints (6) imply
that the total capacity requirement of the resources using a
given type of facility should not exceed the available capacity
at that hospital. Owing to constraints (7), for service s to be
provided in a hospital, the hospital should serve a minimum
demand of m1s units. Constraints (8) ensure that if a service
is not provided in a hospital, no demand is assigned to that
hospital for that service. Constraints (9) imply that in each
hospital that remains open, a minimum of m2 services are
offered. Owing to constraints (10), if a hospital is closed, no
service is offered at this hospital. Constraints (11) ensure that
no more than a predetermined maximum amount of resources
are transferred between a pair of hospitals. Constraints
(12)–(15) are integrality and 0–1 requirements.
Our model has O(|H |(1+|S|+|R||H |+|P||S|)) variables
and O(|H |(1+|C |+2|R|+3|S|+|P||S|+|R||H |)+|P||S|)
constraints.
The model does not forbid unused resources from
remaining at hospitals which have closed. If all resources
were to be transferred to hospitals that remain open after the














∀i ∈ H, c ∈ C
These new constraints imply that for i ∈ H whenever yi
is zero, the final amount of resource r at hospital i , that is,
Cri + ∑ j∈H :i∈Hj xr ji −
∑
j∈Hi xri j is zero for all r ∈
∏
c and
c ∈ C .
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It is also possible to apply different rules for different
types of resources. For instance, if a hospital is closed, then
it may be necessary to re-allocate all specialist doctors, but
beds that are not required may remain. We can model the
requirement that all the amount of resource r ∈ R needs to
be re-allocated if hospital i ∈ H is closed by adding the
constraint
∑
j∈Hi xri j Cri (1 − yi ). If yi = 0, this constraint
becomes
∑
j∈Hi xri j Cri . This together with constraint (2)
implies
∑
j∈Hi xri j = Cri stating that all available resource r
should be transfered to other hospitals. If yi = 1, then the
constraint is redundant.
If the wish is not to close any hospital, then constraints (9)
are replaced with
∑
s∈Susi  max{m2, 1} for all i ∈ H , vari-
ables yi are fixed to 1, and constraints (10) are removed. Some
services may be required to exist in any hospital that remains
open. If service s ∈ S is such a service, then constraint (10)
for hospital i ∈ H should be replaced with usi = yi .
Note that there is an inherent tension between the desire not
to close any hospitals and the need to have a high number of
patients served in all hospitals to increase quality. This trade-
off is reflected in the parameters m2 and m1s , respectively.
A high m1s implies more volume, hence better quality with
increased centralization. However, a high m2 pushes for more
decentralized service to increase accessibility to services. The
model parameters must be set by the policy makers, or the
hospital network managers, reflecting their strategic choice
given this trade-off. Finally, note that estimating parameters
may be the most challenging part of implementing the model
in practice. These weights represent strategic choices between
quality and access, or costs to the hospitals and costs to the
patients, which are political issues open to debate.
4. Case study
In this section we present an application of the model for
a case of Turkish hospitals in 11 cities. The Turkish Health
System is organized in regional health planning centres. These
11 cities are those that are governed by one of the planning
centres and they are all located in the central-western Anatolia.
Our choice of services and resources to include in the study
was limited by the availability of data. We focus on two
basic resources: hospital beds and specialist doctors for each
service. Five inpatient services are considered: (1) internal
medicine, (2) general surgery, (3) ear, nose and throat, (4)
orthopaedics and (5) urology. Since each specialist doctor can
be used only for their respective service, we have six different
resources in the analysis. Below, first we explain the data set
used, and then discuss the results.
4.1. Demand estimation
The demand data are estimated using data given in the Statis-
tics Yearbook (2004) published online by the TurkishMinistry
of Health. We first estimated the total demand in each city,
then allocated that to the two insurance funds, SSK and MoH.
The procedure is as follows: Number of inpatient discharges
Table 2 Summary information on the two hospital networks
Bed INM GSU ENT ORT URO
Capacity (number of resources)
SSK 2145 83 106 64 66 60
MoH 3676 154 237 143 120 117
Capacity (patients per year)
SSK 156 585 43 824 38 584 14 400 25 674 18 840
MoH 268 348 81 312 86 268 32 175 46 680 36 738
Demand (patients per year)
SSK 129 537 43 606 41 044 12 824 19 239 12 824
MoH 229 796 78 674 72 657 21 499 35 467 21 499
The specialist doctors are labelled as INM: internal medicine, GSU:
general surgery, ENT: ear, nose and throat, ORT: orthopaedics, URO:
urology.
and deaths for each city and percentage of patients for each
service among all inpatient demand are given in the yearbook.
Multiplying total demand with percentage figures, we found
the total number of patients for each service in each city. The
number of employees insured by the SSK fund in a given city
is reported by the Social Security Institute. We multiplied that
with 41 to reflect the family of those employees who benefit
from the fund. The ratio of this number to the population size
gave us the percentage of patients that are insured by SSK
in each city. All the remaining patients use the MoH hospi-
tals. We should note that using the historical data on number
of inpatient discharges underestimates the demand, since the
demand that could not be met is actually lost, but this is the
only data available to us. A summary of the general charac-
teristics of the two networks are given in Table 2.
4.2. Capacity estimation
We obtained the data on capacities of the hospitals in the
region from the Turkish Ministry of Health. Among those
hospitals only the general hospitals are considered in the
analysis. There are 16 hospitals in the SSK network and 31
hospitals in the MoH network. Together they comprise 5821
hospital beds and 1150 specialist doctors. The raw data were
given in terms of the number of beds and the number of
specialist doctors; we converted them to units of ‘number of
patients per year’. Average length of stay was given as 5 days
in the Statistics Yearbook (2004), so capacity of a bed is set to
365/5=73 patients/year. The number of beds that a specialist
can serve is set to the average number of beds per special-
ists for each department, calculated using the total number of
beds and specialists data. Then that number is multiplied by
73 to find the number of patients per doctor for each specialist
group. Table 2 gives the capacity figures used. Table 3 gives
the number of beds and the number of specialist doctors
per 100 000 people for each city in consideration, which
1 The number of dependents per insured for the year 2004 was found to
be 4.4 according to the statistics provided by SSK in 2007 (SSK, 2007);
hence 4 is a reasonable approximation.
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Table 3 Summary information on distribution of resources
among cities
City Bed INM GSU ENT ORT URO
Number of resources per 100 000 people
Ankara 62.38 2.87 5.19 3.22 2.79 2.74
Afyon 58.22 1.97 1.97 1.11 1.11 0.98
Corum 66.99 1.84 2.34 1.34 1.00 1.34
Eskisehir 62.46 2.83 2.55 1.56 1.42 1.42
Kastamonu 38.88 1.60 2.40 1.07 1.60 0.80
Kutahya 75.81 2.74 2.59 1.22 1.67 1.07
Zonguldak 89.67 3.41 3.25 1.95 1.79 1.62
Bartin 85.79 7.60 8.69 6.52 5.43 4.34
Kirikkale 70.66 1.56 2.61 1.56 0.78 1.56
Karabuk 111.95 3.55 5.78 2.67 2.22 2.22
Cankiri 48.08 0.74 0.74 0.74 1.11 0.74
The specialist doctors are labelled as INM: internal medicine, GSU:
general surgery, ENT: ear, nose and throat, ORT: orthopaedics, URO:
urology.
demonstrates the uneven distribution of the existing capacity
in different cities. The demand and capacity data are available
online at http://www.bilkent.edu.tr/∼hyaman/health.htm.
4.3. Parameter estimation
We fixed the following parameters. We use si = 1.1 for all
s ∈ S and i ∈ H as there is a capacity shortage in the SSK
network for one of the resources (see Table 2). This is not
so unrealistic as the problem of overloaded doctors in the
SSK hospitals has been a well-known issue. The resource
transfer cost for beds and transportation costs are functions
of the travel time. Let di j denote the travel time between
hospital i ∈ H and j ∈ H and d ′ki denote the travel time
between population centre k ∈ P and hospital i ∈ H . We
take the cost of transferring a bed from hospital i to hospital
j as a1i j = 0.1di j and the travelling cost from population
centre k to hospital i as tki = d ′ki . As will be discussed in the
application results, conclusions do not seem to be sensitive
to these parameters. The transfer cost for doctors does not
depend on the distance and is taken to be 1000. This is the
value paid to a doctor whose post is changed in the Turkish
case. We experimented with fixing the value of m1s = 100
for all s ∈ S and changing the value of m2 to 1, 2, 3 and
4. The cost values did not change significantly. For m2 = 4,
no feasible patient assignment could be found for the SSK
network and the merged network if resource transfers were
forbidden. In the remaining, we take m2 =1. Since we would
like all hospitals to remain open, we modify the formulation
accordingly as explained in Section 3. As we are interested
in the potential cost improvement, we assumed there is no
constraint on the maximum number of resources that could
be transferred, and interpret the result as an upper-bound on
the cost reduction. We also assumed that the doctors would
accept to move to their new posts, which is reasonable since
doctors work for the government. Therefore we set ri = 1
and kri j = Cri for all r ∈ R, i ∈ H and j ∈ Hi and remove
the redundant constraints.
Table 4 Effect of resource transfers in the three networks
Network m1s % Improvement in # Transfers of
Total Patient # Patients Beds Doctors
cost travel travelling
cost
100 70.98 72.05 63.28 88 85
MoH 200 70.89 71.91 63.29 86 81
400 73.01 73.97 66.17 86 82
100 57.76 58.71 37.39 186 50
SSK 200 57.83 58.80 37.47 116 53
400 58.30 59.07 38.51 107 42
100 78.51 80.11 67.01 40 48
Merged 200 78.41 80.11 67 39 51
400 80.69 82.51 70.26 38 65
The analysis involves a comparison of three problem
instances, which correspond to three different hospital
networks; ‘SSK’, ‘MoH’ and ‘Merged’ refer to the hospital
network of the Social Security Institute, the network of
the Ministry of Health hospitals and the merged network,
respectively. We focus on two main mechanisms that reduce
network costs. First, by transferring resources between hospi-
tals, the network can be re-designed. This can be done within
any given network, without the need of a merger. Second, by
combining two hospital networks, transportation costs can
be reduced by a better assignment of demands to hospitals.
We refer to these two mechanisms as ‘Resource Transfer’
and ‘Merging’, respectively. In the following, we discuss the
effect of these on the numerical analysis.
The integer programs are solved using CPLEX 9.0.2
with an optimality gap tolerance of 1%. The largest model
(Merged) consists of around 16 000 variables and 4000
constraints, and the longest computation time is 1.73 h.
4.4. Effect of resource transfer
Resource transfers between hospitals imply a re-allocation in
the network, given the locations and capacity limitations at
each location. In this section, we investigate the cost reduction
from transferring hospital beds and specialist doctors between
hospitals.
4.4.1. Effect on total cost Table 4 shows the percentage
improvements in total cost, patient travel cost and the number
of patients travelling to cities other than their population
centres to get service. It also shows the number of beds and
specialist doctors transferred to achieve these improvements.
Thus the cost reduction achieved by resource transfers is about
70% for the Ministry of Health network and 57% for the
Social Security Institute network. After merger, the benefits
from resource transfer increase to 80%. The improvements
from transferring the given number of beds and doctors for
each case are calculated with respect to the best patient assign-
ment costs without resource transfers.
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The merged network gets the most benefit from resource
transfers; the SSK network gets the least. This can be
explained by the different sizes of these three networks: as
the number of hospitals in the network increases, there are
more alternatives for transfers, hence more opportunity for
improvement. Also, the MoH network has lower utilization
levels for specialist doctors, allowing for more flexibility in
moving resources.
The number of transfers made and the cost reduction
achieved are not correlated; the merged network can achieve
the highest improvement by making the least number of
resource transfers. Finally, we observe that improvement
in patient travel cost is more than the improvement in the
number of patients travelling to another population centre.
This shows that by transferring resources, there is a decrease
not only in the number of patients travelling to another city
but also in the average distance travelled by these patients.
The minimum number of patients to be assigned to a
service, m1s , does not have a significant impact on the effect
of resource transfer when the number is 100–400. There is
only a slight gain in cost reduction with a higher m1s .
Table 5 Effect of transferring only specialist doctors
Network % Improvement in
Total cost Patient travel cost # Patients travelling
MoH 61.69 62.65 46.55
SSK 35.21 35.94 15.70
Merged 71.17 72.60 53.96
Table 6 Effect of transferring only beds
Network % Improvement in
Total cost Patient travel cost # Patients travelling
MoH 0.28 0.28 0.55
SSK 7.78 7.78 6.61
Merged 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 7 Effect of resource transfer cost coefficients
Network Res. transfer % Improvement in # Transfers of
cost coefficient
Total cost Patient travel cost # Patients travelling Beds Doctors
0 71.94 71.94 63.34 1141 584
MoH 1 70.89 71.91 63.29 86 81
10 62.30 71.38 61.30 88 73
0 58.78 58.78 37.47 232 204
SSK 1 57.83 58.80 37.47 116 53
10 52.16 58.68 37.43 94 35
0 80.11 80.11 67.01 1769 930
Merged 1 78.41 80.11 67.00 39 51
10 63.23 78.94 65.61 42 47
Next, we investigate the benefits when we transfer only
one type of resources, either beds or specialist doctors. Here
we take m1s = 200 for all s ∈ S. Tables 5 and 6 summarize
the results; most of the resource transfer benefits are gener-
ated by transferring doctors, while bed re-allocation brings
a slight benefit. This is reasonable as beds are shared by
the five services in consideration whereas doctors serve only
their specialty services. This may act in combination with a
good initial distribution which does not give much leeway for
improvement.
4.4.2. The quality/decentralization trade-off The quality/
decentralization trade-off can be studied by comparing results
of instances with different m1s and m2 values. Small m1s
values imply less strict quality constraints; m2 = 0 implies
hospital closures are allowed. We compared cases in which
hospital closures were not allowed (m2 > 0) and m1s value
was small (100, 200, 400) with cases in which m2 = 0 and
m1s value was large (1000). In the latter case, a feasible
solution can be achieved only after resource transfers. But
as expected, when m1s is large, the total cost of the merged
network is higher than the cost of the network when m1s
is smaller. Increasing m1s from 400 to 1000 increases total
costs by about 22%.
4.4.3. Sensitivity to unit resource transfer costs The last
experiment in this section investigates the effect of resource
transfer costs. We multiply the unit resource transfer costs
by a coefficient which takes values of 0, 1 and 10. Table 7
shows that the improvement in patient travel cost is quite close
in all cases. There are significantly more transfers when the
resource transfer cost is 0, since it represents the extreme case
of free resource movements. However, a 10-fold increase in
the resource transfer cost (from 1 to 10) does not have as much
effect on the number of transfers made. This suggests that
these transfers are quite useful in reducing the total system
costs and the solution is hardly sensitive to the estimation of
these costs.
Finally, we note that no feasible patient assignment exists
in these networks for si =1 for s ∈ S. However after resource
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transfers, the MoH and merged networks have feasible assign-
ments. Feasible assignments could not be found even after
resource transfers when si = 0.9 for s ∈ S.
4.5. Effect of merging without resource transfers
Table 8 summarizes the comparisons of optimal costs before
and after the merger, without resource transfers. Even if beds
and doctors are not re-allocated, the merger results in a better
patient-hospital assignment and can achieve a cost reduction
of up to 78%.With the re-assignment, both number of patients
travelling to another city to get service, and average distance a
patient travels is decreased. The benefits of merging decrease
slightly with the increasing quality standard, m1s .
4.6. Interaction of merging and resource transfer
In previous sections, merging and resource transfer effects
were presented separately. Here, we look at the interaction
of these two effects. Table 9 shows that there is a synergy
between merging and resource transfer. There is more benefit
in merging two networks if transferring resources is possible.
Similarly, there is more benefit from resources transfers if
two networks are merged. Therefore, resource transfers can
be used to improve efficiency when networks merge. In this
example, the overall improvement is a reduction in cost from
13745 750 to 646889; this amounts to a decrease of 95.29%.
As indicated by the figures for the isolated effects of resource
transfers (65.56%) and merging (78.10%), merging two
networks provides more benefits than transferring resources
within the two separate networks.
5. Conclusion
This paper introduced a model for re-planning hospitals after
a merger of hospital networks. The objective is to minimize
the patient transportation cost and the cost of changes in
Table 8 Effect of merging without resource transfer
m1s % Improvement in




Table 9 Interaction of resource transfer and merging effects on the cost reduction (m1s = 100 for all s ∈ S and m2 = 1)
Total cost Reduction by resource transfer
No resource transfer Resource transfer
No merging 13 745 750 4 733 679 65.56%
Merging 3 010 230 646 889 78.51%
Reduction by merging 78.10% 86.33%
the system by optimizing resource allocations, service port-
folios and assignment of patients to hospitals. The model
is based on an assignment formulation, with the addition of
resource-transfer decisions which allows for a re-design of
the network after the merger. It provides a novel approach
to M&As, with its attention to the resource level of planning
after a merger. It also takes into account constraints related
with quality standards and hospital closures.
We investigated the potential for cost reduction in this
model by applying it to a subset of hospitals in the Turkish
hospital system. We had meetings with the head of treatment
services department at the Ministry of Health and several
specialists and verified our model assumptions with them.
Our model serves as a benchmark which shows the poten-
tial gains of working on resource allocations to the health
authorities.
Our study showed that there was a significant cost reduction
opportunity by re-allocating beds and doctors and re-assigning
patients after a merger. We found that merging two networks
brings significant reduction in transportation costs by a new
matching of demand and supply. In addition to the assignment
benefits, there was a benefit from re-designing the network by
transferring resources between hospitals. The benefits from
resource transfer and better assignment of demand and supply
are complementary.
Numerical results showed that cost improvements of up to
78% could be achieved by re-allocation of resources. This
surprisingly high improvement result can be attributable to
two factors: First, the existing allocation seems to be very
inefficient. A comparison of number of resources per 100 000
people in each city (Table 3) illustrates the inequality in avail-
able capacity of different cities. Second, there are some cost
components not included in the objective function such as
costs of merging and costs of operating the hospitals. There-
fore, these results should only be considered as an upper
bound on the improvements that could be achieved if resource
re-allocation was to be considered in reality.
The model has applications beyond M&As. It can be useful
whenever there is a need, or an opportunity to re-design an
existing hospital network. The introduction of new standards
for hospitals is an example. If the size of small hospitals
will be increased by re-distributing the existing resources in
the network, the model can be used with a corresponding
constraint on quality standard. The model can also be useful
when a hospital is closed and the resources of that hospital
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must be distributed to the remaining ones in the network.
Similarly, when a hospital is added to an existing network, the
network performance can be enhanced by making changes in
the network, taking a holistic perspective.
The model can also be seen as an assessment tool to
understand the potential for improving the whole network
by a change like merging with another network, introducing
a new hospital, or simply increasing the capacity of one
hospital.
Finally, although the model presented in this paper
is tailored to hospital network problems, it can be modified
for use in production–inventory management systems where
re-designing facilities can be considered after mergers.
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